These clashes also underscored the new governments weak control over local police forces. One-person rule protected the police from the multiple influences and pressures exerted by the criminal underworld, political leaders, and international organizations, each pulling in different directions. Most other former Soviet states kept the military outside the political decision-making process. 20Although Kyrghyzstans armed forces are ethnically diverse, they do not exactly mirror ethnic composition of the country at large.10 Despite that ethnic cleavages within the army still persist and military service is still considered to be a form of poverty tax, the notion that the army accepts the most physically fit, educated young men irrespective of their ethnic background, is widely shared by the army higher ranked personnel.11 This perception survived Bakiyevs five-year tenure despite his preference for military promotions based on personal loyalty, rather than professional background. The armed forces remained at their regular posts when the riots turned violent. At the same time, state power institutions would be informally challenged by competing criminal groups or politicians. Felix Kulov, leader of Ar-Namys party and former Interior Minister, was among the first leaders to criticize the OSCEs decision to deploy unarmed personnel.

As more information became public about the involvement of state forces in violence against civilians, the more the military and police began to fear external intervention. Myrzakhmatovs control in Osh is so strong that the current government in Bishkek must create parallel state structures to be able to compete with his influence over the city's local government structures (including law-enforcement) 8. Like some other officials in Kyrgyzstan, Myrzakhmatov is said to control an informal "army" of martial arts sportsmen as well as former military and law-enforcement personnel. Finally, Zhanysh was believed to have plotted the assassination of regime opponents, including the former head of the presidents administration, Medet Sadyrkulov, and Gennady Pavluk, a journalist. The new president disregarded the importance of a holistic approach to security, a strategy that would democratize control over security structures and involve a greater number of political and civic actors in security policy making. 22In contrast, Bakiyev encouraged the police to have personal loyalty to specific officials instead of protecting the population. 7 What Role Did Crime Kingpins Play in Southern Kyrgyzstans Violence?, Eurasia Insight, June 23, 2010. This inheritance partly explained why the Kyrgyz government paid limited attention to the military sector throughout the 1990s, instead prioritizing political and economic reforms. 42The head of the NSS, Keneshbek Dushebayev, denied allegations and claims that members of his service were stationed in a car 200 meters away from Tashiyevs house when Tashiyevs guards dragged one of the NSS personnel from the car and beat him inside the politicians house. 35Military leaders, in turn, argued that they had only a limited ability to control the situation in the first two days of the violence. The situation was somewhat more difficult in the Interior Ministry. 40But they were also aware that competing political forces, not represented in the government, were enjoying informal control over police personnel. Training and discipline are particularly low among police personnel, while control over the police is tailored to the needs of local power brokers.

Given that roughly 13 percent of all ethnic Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan live in southern Kyrgyzstan, law-enforcement agencies are far from reflecting the ethnic composition of the local society. Interethnic Violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan and its Aftermath, Human Rights Watch, August 16, 2010; The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan, International Crisis Group, August 23, 2010. Under Bakiyev, drug traffickers and organized criminal groups found a safe haven in Kyrgyzstan's south, further frustrating local residents. The article concludes with a discussion of the challenges to the parliamentary system of governance posed by the fragmented police and armed forces and what military reform efforts might occur in Kyrgyzstan. 14 Interview, former conscript, July 2010. Lawmaker Zhanybek Kydykbayev said deploying troops stood to discredit Kyrgyzstan in the eyes of the Kazakh people since it signaled the governments support for Kazakhstans Tokayev. wikipedia Dastan Bekeshev, an independent member in the legislature, Planes carrying the troops were reportedly on the runway at the CSTO air base in Kant, a town around 25 kilometers east of the capital, Bishkek, awaiting a presidential confirmation of the parliaments vote. Planes carrying the troops were reportedly on the runway at the CSTO air base in Kant, a town around 25 kilometers east of the capital, Bishkek, awaiting a presidential confirmation of the parliaments vote. 47Mobilization of informal armed groups supporting various political parties is another challenge brought by the decentralization of political power under a parliamentary system. The vast majority of the victims were shot in the chest, head, and neck, reportedly by foreign snipers deployed on the rooftop of a government building in central Bishkek. It argues that the higher military leadership in Bishkek shares a common distrust of the Tashkent regime and overall uncertainly about power sharing two months after regime change, while lower level personnel may have provoked the Uzbek minority, because of their nationalist feelings (the majority of police and army personnel are ethnic Kyrgyz) and overall frustration with the fragmented political leadership. 11Bakiyev also lost control over his brother Zhanysh Bakiyev, which eventually led to unprecedented violence in the country. Of course, a state can always refuse, it has every right to do so, but we are parties to a collective security agreement and these agreements have been ratified.. 13The April 7 bloodbath in Bishkek, which took the lives of 86 people, serves as a powerful demonstration of the potential consequences of military intervention in politics. According to Tashiyev, NSS personnel deliberately provoked him in front of his house before a few armed NSS personnel began shooting at his house and his bodyguards. Russia stands to earn the most geopolitical benefit from what is happening in Kazakhstan. They were uncertain about who in the new government had the authority to control the ministries of defense and internal affairs. In addition, the military is widely regarded as an institution of the poor; that is, for citizens unable to bribe their way out of compulsory service. This uncertainty intensified as the new government faced numerous challenges related to establishing own legitimacy. (Photo: Danil Usmanov). The police and armed forces became part of the conflict, rather than a solution1.

The Ata-Jurt-NSS showdown revealed the infighting between former president Bakievs loyal regime followers and the current government, which is made up mostly of Bakiyevs former opponents. 6The erosion of political leadership began under former president Kurmanbek Bakiyev5. Bribes begin before joining the police, as candidates must pay bribes to be admitted to police academies. 20 Interview, former interim government official.

If control continues to decentralize under a parliamentary system, the power institutions are likely to become ever more fragmented along regional and ethnic lines. Indeed, both the military and police might develop different reactions to the same experience, with one turning into more ethnicity-blind institution than the other. kyrgyzstan seal russia military base Russias Defense Ministry later, Not all of Scorpion, just part of it. They were allegedly hired by Zhanysh6.

Because of the shared narrative among some government officials that the violence was pre-organized and did not represent a bottom-up movement, some military leaders argued that they were not authorized to order shooting of civilian population20. Under CSTO rules, we can send humanitarian aid instead of military support.

The Osh and Jalalabad violence would serve as a model for the military and police of how to increase professionalism and loyalty to the state and the nation. Bakiyev, however, increasingly relied on the support of the security services, which gradually asserted control over military structures as well. 7This article is organized as follows: it begins by providing background on former presidents Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev and how they led the police and armed forces. However, the data available a few months after the conflict make it possible to identify two layers of threat perception: one directed against another state (Uzbekistan) and one against a different ethnicity (Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan). He proposed significantly changing the militarys structure, revising national security documents, and increasing civilian oversight. 49Aside from stable political institutions, other steps necessary to consolidate police forces into coherent units include breaking the nexus with the criminal world, halting access to the drugs market, and preventing political factions and individual politicians from obtaining control over military and police institutions. 5Under the guidance of such an uncertain and hesitant national leadership, army and police personnel either overstepped their mandate or chose not to follow the commands of the political officials. The interdependence would deepen between power institutions and politicians, on the one hand, and power institutions and the criminal underworld on the other. Protesters outside the parliament in Bishkek. Protecting its own status, the military became the major force to oppose international investigations of the June violence as well as the OSCEs 52-member Police Advisory Group. The article argues that the higher military leadership shares distrust of Tashkent regime, while lower level personnel may have provoked the Uzbek minority because of their own anti-Uzbeknationalist feelings2 (the majority of police and army personnel are ethnic Kyrgyz) and overall frustration with the fragmented political leadership. The police were ordered to shoot-to-kill on Saturday (June 13) morning, although the police had already been randomly using loaded weapons against the population. Kyrgyzstans NGO leaders argue that the police and army began shooting at civilians, predominantly ethnic Uzbeks, without waiting for the political leaderships command16. Who will take responsibility for that? Kydykbayev said. Kamchybek Tashiyev, the head of the State Committee for National Security, told deputies that the mission of Kyrgyz troops had only peaceful purposes, but he acknowledged that there were risks that could not be anticipated. 2At this point it is difficult to argue that the behavior of police and army personnel reflects the ethno-nationalist perceptions of the higher military and political leadership or are a byproduct of their inadequate understanding of the situation on the ground. A shortage of troops, equipment, fuel, and reliable communication devices made matters worse. This behavior is further reinforced by the fact that ethnic minorities often live in insular communities, making it difficult for the central state to penetrate. 14Importantly, unlike the police, Kyrgyzstans army never genuinely recognized Bakiyevs authority. In the south members of the Ata-Jurt party and Osh mayor Myrzakhmatov enjoyed informal control over police as well. Akayev also realized that the inherited Soviet-style military structure failed to meet the requirements of the post-cold war period and needed to be reformed.

Without coherent political leadership over the military and police, human rights abuses will continue to be entrenched in the everyday lives of locals, particularly in southern Kyrgyzstan. Only in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the Kyrgyz national army failed to adequately respond to a group of armed guerrillas that crossed the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, did President Akayev see the military as vital for preserving national sovereignty. standoff codm
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