. But pressure from war victims was partly responsible.
Les travaux sur les aspects conomiques, politiques, sociaux et culturels de la guerre et sur ses consquences se multiplient.
It is by Christopher Brennan and is entitled Reforming Austria-Hungary: beyond his control or beyond his capacity?
Fritz Fellner, Austria-Hungary in Keith Wilson (ed.
It was, however, opposed by all other nationalities.
Alas, this only stimulated rumours, which the state found difficult to control. Politische Dokumente zu Kaiser und Knig Karl I (IV) aus Internationalen Archiven (Vol. Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance, 1914-1918, East European Monographs (1985) show not merely how extensive the differences between the two powers were but how Austria-Hungary, despite continuous defeats and the need for German military aid, not to say rescue, stoutly refused to buckle under German diplomatic pressure, continuously coming up instead with plans for Austrian domination of various parts of Europe and consistently refusing to commit herself definitively to the German scheme for Mitteleuropa, even after signing up to it at Spa.
We need to know more, for example, about relations between officers and men in the army and about other parts of the home front rather than just Vienna. Another work which covers the immediate background is Milan N. Vegos Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy, 1904-1914 (1996), which stresses that Austria-Hungarys naval policy was not the result of German pressure but was based on (p. 195) the interplay of her needs to acquire the status of a great sea power in both the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Curiously, however, he questions her need to build dreadnoughts (p. 194): Surely it would have been more sensible and valuable for Austria-Hungary to spend her limited funds on building smaller surface combatants and submarines than on dreadnoughts and semi-dreadnoughts? Maybe, as shall be seen, this is due to his reading of the war at sea after 1914 backwards, but even then it is difficult to understand how Austria-Hungary could have become a great sea power without dreadnoughts or how she could have countered France and Italy in the Mediterranean and Adriatic during the war itself without them. To the extent that Austria-Hungary did fight the war on the cheap, that was not an outcome of choice, but of necessity in light of inadequate resources. Margaret MacMillans The War That Ended Peace. I myself have always supported this second viewpoint which is clear from my Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815-1918 (2001).
It was also important that neither Bulgaria nor Germany should dominate the Western Balkans, which should be Austria-Hungarys exclusive sphere of influence.
All enemy troops had been expelled from the lands of the Monarchy.
Austria-Hungarys record in the Great War, from its early defeats to its final acceptance of Ludendorffs supreme command, suggests that the latter cannot be lightly ignored. 57Healys first chapter describes the effect of the food crisis on Vienna and shows that the Viennese blamed it less on the allied blockade or the loss of Galicia than on the Hungarians, local Austrian farmers, Viennese merchants and fellow citizens. There is an extremely peculiar article by Geoffrey Wawro, entitled Morale in the Austro-Hungarian Army: the Evidence of Habsburg Army Campaign Reports and Allied Intelligence Officers, which has to be confronted in this context. True, at the start of the war, Vienna had few specific war aims in mind apart from defeating Serbia militarily and making her a tributary or dependent state.
 Students should consult its bibliography as well as that in Herwigs book for the older and more detailed literature. The author then presents his own contribution, based on memorials in North and East Tyrol, as one of preliminary conclusions.
(p. 130): 39The failure of the railways was very instrumental in the final economic and military collapse since there was often large amounts of fuel, raw material, and finished products that could not be delivered. 10-11): 46Quite unwittinglyKarls road to holiness has provided the most significant boost to historical research.
6The situation regarding the nationality question as a factor influencing Austria-Hungarys outlook in 1914 has also continued to produce a large literature.
), For some new literature on the attitude of the nationalities during the war, see Hans Mommsen, On the developing research into POWs, see: Ernst Gusenbauer, Auf den Spuren einer ergessener Zeit. On the other hand, by 1918 the Monarchys war aims had been fulfilled: Serbia and Russia had been crushed, Romania had ceded some strategic territory (the Iron Gates) to Austria-Hungary and agreed to border rectifications, and Austria-Hungary still had a say in the future of Poland.
The first chapter covers the period from 1868.
 Also invaluable is Christoph Fhr, Die k.uk Armeeoberkommando und die Innenpolitik in ?sterreich, 1914-1917 (1968). Ke-Chin Hsia, A Partnership of the Weak: War Victims and the State in the Early First Austrian Republic, in Gnther Bischof and Fritz Plassner (eds. It was necessary, therefore, to force the state to live up to its responsibilities.
Finally, the persistent and widespread food scarcity and resultant physical exhaustion of both civilian population and the armed forces was a key factor in bringing about the collapse of the Habsburg Empire.. Tous droits rservs pour tous pays. This was a fatal error.
The ammunition shortages experienced in the last major Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy in June 1918 was second only to the failure in military tactics in contributing to the defeat of the Imperial Army These shortages reduced the number of active artillery batteries in Conrads forces by fiftythe Army High Command calculated that the army needed an additional 4,500 railway cars to supply all the food needed on the eve of the offensiveTransportation must be considered the Monarchys Achilles Heel. He simply kept refusing any concessions to Italy, Romania or Bulgaria, despite the threat of Italian and Romanian intervention on the allied side. Russian and German occupation policies elsewhere were much harsher. As a result, though useful articles have appeared, no works of academic quality exist on Karls life and reign as a whole. Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918, which, peculiarly, is better on the Austrian home front than on her military record.
The historiography of Austria-Hungarys involvement in the First World War, has grown rapidly in recent decades. Given that he is now a candidate for canonization (he was beatified in 2004), much of the recent literature on him is unreliable. By this time, 90 per cent of letters handled in Vienna and Feldkirch by the censors were complaining of food supply problems.
They were allowed to pursue hobbies and put on theatrical works in which better-looking younger males took the place of females. In particular, reputations such as that of the former chief of staff, Franz Conrad von Htzendorf had to be protected.
Once published, this will be an important work. All her own troops were fighting abroad.
), Schicksalsjahre sterreichs, 1869-1936: Die Erinnerungen und Tagebcher Josef Redlichs (3 Vols., 2011). George Plaschka, Horst Haselsteiner and Arnold Suppan.
The fact that there was some variation in the degree of loyalty or indifference within the various non-German ethnic groups, and that many German-Austrian soldiers shared in the general decline in morale does not alter the fact that the ethnic divisions within the army exacerbated by irredentist agitation on the home front, were a fundamental cause of its ineffectiveness under the strain of a modern war..
The foreign ministry also wanted Albania to remain theoretically independent and neutral despite military occupation and Conrads desire to annexe or dismember the country. Les raisons du dclenchement de la guerre par la monarchie des Habsbourg continuent de faire dbat, mais avec quelques rvisions: ce nest pas tant la crise des nationalits qui a conduit les responsables politiques choisir la guerre que leur agenda propre, soutenant les buts de guerre allemands et poursuivant eux-mmes des buts de guerre propres, tout en sous-estimant les risques de conflit.
Silberstein has also written an important article demonstrating how Conrad, as Austria-Hungarys military chief-of-staff, failed to dominate Austrian diplomacy, namely The High Command and Diplomacy in Austria-Hungary, 1914-1916. Certainly, they had persevered far longer than anyone in 1914 including the generals had considered they might. , 7The standard account of Austria-Hungarys wartime diplomacy is to be found in chapters seven, eight and nine of Roy F. Bridges The Habsburg Monarchy Among The Great Powers, 1815-1918 (1990, pp.
For example, of the 56 essays published in the first four volumes resulting from the conferences held by the International Society for First World War Studies, only two are largely devoted to Habsburg studies. Most Jews in the Habsburg Empire focused their attention squarely on Tsarist Russia and saw themselves and Austria-Hungary as liberators of Russian Jewry, thus uniting their Jewish and Habsburg loyalties., Alan Sked, Historians, the Nationality Question and the Downfall of the Habsburg Empire,.
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14History has not been kind to the Habsburg army and its record in the First World War. He even questions whether war memorials really reflect how the dead were remembered afterwards.
), Die Regelung der Arbeitsverhltnisse im Kriege. In the cabbage there are worms we have to live and fight like this. This policy was pursued aggressively by the German nationalists, with tactical endorsements from the Christian Socials and the support of the Poles. As it turned out, no grain came from the Ukraine, but Austrias cession of Cholm to that country so infuriated her Poles that there could no longer be any thought of an Austro-Polish solution, if indeed any prospect of one still existed.
The octroi had therefore become a menace to peace prospects in the East and in the West, and to domestic harmony. However, by the autumn of 1918, with everything everywhere collapsing, the allies no longer cared to guarantee the Monarchys own survival and far less that of its military conquests in the Balkans when the war eventually ended.
Civilian ration quotas were higher than in starving Austria itself, and Serbia in military eyes was to become the breadbasket for the army and its friends, not for the home front.  Fortunately, there are now a number of more general surveys of the Austro-Hungarian war economy. Die Versorgung der Invaliden des Ersten Weltkrieges. These include Zedenek Jindra, Der wirtschaftliche Zerfall ?sterreich-Ungarns in Alice Teichova and Herbert Matis (eds.). 64While much has been written on the Habsburg Monarchy and the First World War, clearly there remain many gaps and many opportunities for more research. The key question about Habsburg government at the highest level during the First World War concerns not the role of Franz Joseph or even the role of the army in occupied or militarily sensitive territories, but why there was no radical change after the death of Franz Joseph in November 1916 and the accession of the Emperor Karl I. Das Wirken des ?sterreichischen Schwarzen Kreuzes in der Zwischenkriegszeit (unpublished dissertation, Graz, 1993). By early April, however, peace was no nearer on either front, while the domestic situation plagued by lack of food, unrest and strikes had continued to worsen. In the event, the gamble failed. And the father State sic is not conscious of its duty. In March 1917, the Russian Revolution put the first nail in the coffin of the policy by radicalizing the masses (particularly the Czechs in Bohemia), the political opponents of the policy and the Poles.
 Indeed, there is no good book in English on the Habsburg army in the First World War, although Graydon A. Tunstall is expected to publish one next year with Cambridge University Press.
31The story itself is, following Sondhaus, quite straightforward.
Die tschechischen Soldaten ?sterreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg (2011, p. 418) concludes: 24in the light of the available documentary material, it can be stated absolutely in both cases that neither treason nor desertion by Czech troops occurred in the fighting at Esztebnekhuta or in the battle of Zborw. According to one recent estimate, Czech ambivalence towards Austria was strong before 1914, but until the very end never became outright hostility and rejection of Habsburg rule. , 26The initial campaigns against Serbia by Oskar Potioreks army were accompanied by massacres of civilians and the taking of hostages, partly in retaliation for the murders of Austrian troops by Serbian partisans.
10The problem of what to do with Poland would also become a difficult one to resolve. Sozialkonomische Ursprnge ihrer Ideologie und Politik (Schriftenreihe des Ludwig- Boltzmann-Instituts fr Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung) (Vol.
Bridge also wrote the relevant article in Adam Wandruschka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds.
Joachim Giller, Hubert Mader and Christina Seidl.
Had the war ended in a stalemate or a victory for the Central Powers, outright Czech independence would never have been proclaimed yet few Czech soldiers ever switched sides or mutinied before the very end of the war.
Austrian prisoner-of-war (POW) camps were often places of ill-treatment also.
The Entente drew a line at the mouth of the Adriatic and left the sea itself to Austria-Hungary. 16There can be no doubt from all accounts of the war that Conrads military record was deplorable and that the armys strategic leadership was appalling. 51Thereafter, the government sought desperately to appease the incensed nationalists (with moderate success), but did not attempt to reach out to other factions.
Conrad, on the other hand, saw victory on the Eastern Front and the defeat of Russia as the key to any general peace, although he did realise the economic importance of the Balkans to the Monarchy.
18Wawro argues that the Habsburg army would have disintegrated much sooner had the Germans not propped it up or had it been subject to more allied offensives in the West.
But now our patience runs out even widows have a right to live.
 Background to his research is provided by John Paul Newmans review article, War in the Balkans, while another perspective is offered by Alexander Will, Kein Griff nach der Weltmacht.
The Balkan, Italian and Eastern Fronts are usually ignored, or else the Habsburg forces are treated as a minor satellite army of Germany.
40Nonetheless, he is certainly right in pointing to food shortages as a key factor in the defeat of the Empire, a factor exacerbated, as he rightly points out, by the actions of the Hungarian government.
The foreign minister believed that the US had now decisively tipped the scales in favour of the enemy and understood that the octroi stood in complete contradiction to the calls for self-determination trumpeted by Wilson. Basing himself on the clearly undeniable and rather obvious fact that the Habsburg army had to be rescued by the Germans on all fronts as well as on the accounts of a handful of prisoners who surrendered to allied, mainly French captors, Wawro repeats all the charges made against the Habsburg army by its post-1918 detractors: the First World War, it is argued here, revealed as never before Austria-Hungarys social, political and military weaknesses. John Harbon, Franz Josefs Forgotten U-Boat Captains. When Italy entered the war, the Austrians immediately attacked several points on the Italian coast, destroying a few bridges and railway tracks and killing a few military personnel and civilians. The Jews of Galicia and Russian Poland, however, treated Austrian and German troops as liberators, which led to the Russians mistreating them when they retreated.
 The latter work, despite its authors excellent knowledge of the archives, suffers from a lack of footnotes. (p. 293). Besides Austrias defensive victories on the Isonzo front, which consisted of some almost unassailable positions, the Habsburg armys record in the war was one of chronic failure. (p. 400) His conclusion (pp. One older work that gives the background is L. Brgel, Soziale Gesetzgebung in ?sterreich, 1848 bis 1918 Eine geschichtliche Darstellung (1919).
In any case, the ultimate commander in chief of the armed forces Kaiser Franz Joseph tended only to discuss foreign policy with his foreign minister. Furthermore, the Slavs now had a platform to denounce imperial excesses and to stake their claims for greater rights and autonomy.
Besides, Tisza had no intention of absorbing more Slavs into the Monarchy, an issue that Conrad simply dismissed or overlooked. In Austria, the old Austro-Hungarian general staff took control of the War Archive and defended its own record when writing up the seven-volume, official history of the war sterreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg so that defeat was placed on ethnic disloyalty rather than bad leadership.
So, too, did Berchtold, who was willing to lose Galicia but not control of Serbia.
This measure, which concerned principally (but not exclusively) Czech detainees, was greeted with dismay and anger by the Germans who, for the first time, began to lose their trust and confidence in the emperor. The most notable work in English has been Maureen Healys, Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire. And the amnesty backfired completely when many of the released men returned to their homelands to resume their agitation against the empire.
For the most part, the strategy of staying in port at Pola was a good one.
The Germans, on the other hand, not merely went on to plan huge annexations in the East, but came up with schemes for the wholesale economic reorganisation of Central Europe that would have subordinated the whole Habsburg Monarchy to Germany in short, the plans for Mitteleuropa.
It may be true that Conrad saw the eastern front and the struggle against Russia as being more important for military survival, something which objectively was true a Russian army pouring through the Carpathians on to the Hungarian Great Plain represented a lethal threat to the Monarchy in a way that Serbian military strategy certainly never did nor could; it may be true, also, that Austria-Hungary saw the campaign against Italy as one against a traditional enemy and one, therefore, which united all populations of the Monarchy in enthusiasm for war; but diplomatically, it may be the case that the Balkans had been the cause of the war and thereafter remained at the heart of it for Austria-Hungarys leaders and policy-makers.  More recently the literature has been enriched by the works of Graydon A. Tunstall whose books on Planning for War against Russia and Serbia: Austro-Hungarian and German Military Strategies, 1871-1914 (1993), and Blood on the Snow. 1In a lecture to the Royal Historical Society some years ago, I distinguished between two schools of thought regarding the role of the Habsburg Monarchy in the origins of the First World War.
In December 1916, in the month after coming to power, he dismissed the experienced Koerber as Prime Minister and subsequently let the moderate Spitzmller slip away, even though both men supported the return of parliamentary rule and opposed the abusive use of the autocratic paragraph 14 of the constitution.
(Some ships, it was true, were oil-burning but problems of receiving oil from Austrian Galicia when it remained Austrian of course simply exacerbated Austrias fuel problem. Stephen Beller, The Tragic Carnival: Austrian Culture in the Great War, in Aviel Roshwald and Richard Stites (eds.).
In fact see below there is a great deal of mythology about the Czechs who supposedly did desert. There I relied on a famous article by Istvn Dek to demonstrate how the army had fought on till the end.
The Germans refused to listen to Austrian pleas for a compromise peace and overrode Austrian interests in the Balkans and Poland.
 All volumes cover the armys role in wartime administration.  A work that looks at the provision of social care from the viewpoint of the war victims themselves, on the other hand, is the as yet unpublished doctoral dissertation of Ke-Chin Hsia (University of Chicago, 2013) entitled The Politics of War Victim Welfare in Austria, 1914-1925.
He considered moderates and reformists such as Lammasch, Redlich and Polzer-Hoditz but each time yielded to pressure from the Germans (and indeed from the all-powerful Czernin). 47So what does this latest research reveal?
It was defeated neither by the subversion of the nationalities who fought bravely and loyally to the end nor on account of international diplomacy. Graydon A. Tunstall, The Carpathian Winter Campaign of 1915; The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1918; in Peter Pastor and Graydon A. Tunstall (eds.).
), See Robert A. Kann, Franz Joseph und der Ausbruch des Weltkrieges, in, Among key works are Gary B. Cohen, Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914, in, Alan Sked, Social Life and Legal Constraints: the Habsburg Army, 1890-1918,.
Fortunately, young scholars have emerged from all over the world, many of them brilliant linguists, who if they can all find jobs can be relied upon to complete the picture of what actually happened to the Monarchy between 1914 and 1918.
 The standard German account by Manfried Rauchensteiner, Der Tod der Doppeladlers. But this was already the eleventh hour and drastic action for peace abroad and reform at home was needed. This is by the Austrian historian, Fritz Fellner, although his key passages, as he freely admits, are based on the work of the British historian, John Leslie.
Fourth, a small domestic capital market proved incapable of sustaining wartime borrowing at high levels. This will be published in 2014 by Palgrave Macmillan, London, with the title The Final Stab at Glory: Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans, 1914-1918.
The navy could therefore protect the southern border of the Empire despite being vastly outnumbered.
 So far as the First World War is concerned, however, one excellent recent essay has addressed the topic, namely Oswald bereggers Erinnerungsorte oder nichtssagende Artefakte? By confirming Seidler in his post as Austrian Prime Minister and nominating Wekerle as his Hungarian counterpart, Karl unwittingly admitted defeat by maintaining the statu quo.
2There is now, of course, a huge literature on the origins of the First World War, and a large one on a variety of aspects of the nationality question inside the Monarchy in the period leading up to 1914. The multinational army, the least prepared for war of all Europes major armies, offered unprecedented sacrifices against a host of well armed enemies.
Moreover, the share of war expenditure in real GDP fell from an initial peak of 30 per cent (1914/15) to about 17 per cent in 1917/18. Peter Pastor, The Home Front in Hungary, 1914-1918, in Kirly and Dreisziger.
50Czernin, hitherto a staunch supporter of the plan, realised that this anti-Slav and undemocratic measure would endanger potential peace negotiations with the revolutionaries in Russia and began to question its wisdom.